ties make them dangerous enough to be liquidated, formal separation from the ROC (which the UOC announced in May 2022) will not make UOC communities any less dangerous. Indeed, if a formal declaration condemning the ROC (even if insincere or intentionally false) or departure from the ROC makes UOC communities safe for the Ukrainian state, the commu

Ukrainian criminal law to punish these clerics. But if the state has no evidence of UOC clergy’s actual participation in ROC bodies and support for Russian aggression, the demand for UOC clergy to publicly and in writing condemn the ROC is legally unenforceable – even if it is politically desirable or morally justified It should also be noted t

The ROC charter, official documents, or decisions of its ruling bodies contain a provision regarding the mandatory appointment of a Ukrainian organisation’s (association’s) leaders or representatives to ROC charter ruling bodies. (This criterion does not apply if all these leaders or representatives publicly and in writing decline their appoint

evidence proving that, due to these connections, a religious organisation is involved in illegal activities In its assessment of the draft of the Law (as of February 2023), the United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk (among other human rights defenders) expressed concern about the February 2023 draft of the Law. Among ot

President Zelensky’s signature follows parliamentary debates since March 2022about banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which is historically and ecclesiastically linked to the Moscow Patriarchate. Law No. 3894-IX gives the Ukrainian government a legal tool to ban religious organisations it thinks are Moscow’s collaborators in Ukraine.